Heaton Hypnosis and Psychotherapy Practice: Attestation and Psychotherapy: Ricoeur and Kaufman...
Heaton Hypnosis and Psychotherapy Practice: Attestation and Psychotherapy: Ricoeur and Kaufman...: Attestation and Psychotherapy: Ricoeur and Kaufmann on Attestation with reference to the work of Judith Herman and Viktor Frankl. E...
Attestation and Psychotherapy: Ricoeur and Kaufmann on Attestation with reference to the work of Judith Herman and Viktor Frankl.
Attestation
and Psychotherapy: Ricoeur and Kaufmann on Attestation with reference
to the work of Judith Herman and Viktor Frankl.
Edward.
S. Gardner
Heaton
Hypnosis and Psychotherapy Practice, Newcastle upon Tyne, United
Kingdom.
Keywords:
Attestation, Testimony, Psychotherapy, Trauma, Post Traumatic
Stress, Paul Ricoeur, Sebastian Kaufmann, Judith. L. Herman, Viktor.
E. Frankl. Logotherapy, Phenomenology, Hermeneutics.
'By
relating a life of which I am not the author as to existence, I make
myself its co-author as to it meaning.' Ricoeur. 1992:162)
In
this brief paper I would like to draw attention to the concept of
attestation or testimony as developed in modern European philosophy
and its significance for the theory and practice of psychotherapy.
Paul
Ricoeur (1913-2005) was an existential – phenomenological
philosopher with a vast range of philosophical interests. In his
later work he elaborated a phenomenological and narrative account of
self identity and meaning. In his Gifford Lectures published in 1992
as Oneself as Another Ricoeur
elaborates
the notion of attestation or
testimony as an aspect of self identity. In these brief reflections I
wish to relate the philosophical notion of attestation to the
practice of psychotherapy. Apart from the work of Ricoeur I have
found instructive the work of Sebastian Kaufmann (2010) The
Attestation of the Self as a Bridge between Hermeneutics and Ontology
in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur.
To
attest means to bear witness or to testify. In this sense the word
attestation is commonly used as a juridical term in jurisprudence and
in matters of trial and judgement. However, Ricoeur broadens the use
of the term and applies it in a phenomenological manner to describe
an essential aspect which denotes the human experience of selfhood,
of being and having a self in the world.
Since
Descartes there have been two extremes which have been used to
describe self identity. On the one hand the Cartesian tradition
attempted to ground the self as an absolute certainty founded on the
thinking Cogito as the basis of being and knowledge. On the
other hand and at the other extreme is the Nietzschean scepticism
which denies any ground or stability to personal identity and
selfhood. Ricoeur through the application of phenomenological
description situates the self between these two philosophical
extremes.
For
Ricoeur selfhood is intimately related to the capacity and activity
of attestation in which the self bears witness and testimony to
itself in the world. It is through attestation that the self is
constituted and disclosed in living. The self – ipseity is a
phenomenal reality where by the attesting self is the power to say,
to do, to have a self identity and to be a subject who is responsible
for action in the world. Attestation also reveals itself in the
experience of credence, trust and 'the assurance of being oneself
(as) acting and suffering.' (Ricoeur:1992:22) The experience of the
self given in attestation is the self assurance and confidence in the
self's way of existing in the world.
Attestation,
on bearing self witness and testimony is properly understood in terms
of an hermeneutic of testimony. Testimony or witness presumes that
the attesting subject has a privileged access to the experience of
the world. As Kaufmann states, 'the self becomes a self only through
the attestation of its own self.' (2010:6) For Ricoeur the
demonstration of the existing self is not simply a matter of
empirical verification. This empirical verification would be an
example of what Ricoeur calls idem – identity as in the
continuity of the same self through time. Ipseity or selfhood
is manifest in testimony and attestation. On giving witness of
oneself to another the self interprets its place in the world by the
meaningful participation in action and events. In attestation we are
not simply dealing with an epistemological operation since the
attesting self involves a practical engagement with the world, the
self becomes a matter akin to practical reason.
As
Kaufmann highlights Ricoeur links attestation to the sense of
assurance, of being affirmed and assured as an acting and suffering
person in the world. Here acting denotes the voluntary and engaged
decisional capacities of the self whereas the suffering self denotes
the involuntary or passive aspects of existence, of the world, the
body as operating upon the self as an objective power. Kaufmann
points out that in the Ricoeurian analysis the assurance of the self
allows a relation to otherness whether it be the identity of others
as persons, as the body as ones own or even the experience of
conscience as other than oneself. Here testimony has moved well
beyond the account that is developed as a concept in jurisprudence.
The attesting self is to be found in the words, works, actions,
speech and engagement in which the self can elaborate itself in the
world and in relation to others.
It
is important to note as Kaufmann points out that in the testimony or
attestation of the self this does not mean that the attesting self
can not also be subject to uncertainty, question, error, suspicion or
inaccuracy. Yet we are not dealing with doubt in the Cartesian sense,
the radical doubt of Descartes which secures the absolute claim of
the Cogito. Rather, Ricoeur speaks of doubt and uncertainty in
relation to a lack of the sense of assurance in self attestation
which can be disclosive of a crisis in identity. Attestation is not
simply the witnessing of facts, events and instances but has a
broader connotation of the encounter with the meaning of human
experience in a global sense.
Kaufmann
further elaborates on the hermeneutical situation in which
attestation occurs. In giving an account of a philosophical
anthropology it is clear attestation or witness occurs within a
phenomenology of human capability or capacity. A phenomenology of
capability entails a descriptive account of the person who as a self
is capable of speaking, doing, acting, telling a story and being
imputed as the originator of action by others but to name a few
aspects of human capability. The human person is capable of witness
and testimony. In attestation the self exhibits credence, trust,
assurance and affirmation which is the self which exists in self
esteem and regard, a self existing in relation to others in their own
attestation, a solicitude between oneself and another.
Two
Phenomenological Forms of Attestation in Psychotherapy: Judith. L.
Herman and Viktor. E. Frankl
Judith.
L. Herman on Testimony in Recovery from Trauma.
In
an historical perspective work on the therapeutic uses of testimony
derives from the experience of political repression, torture and
trauma in particular the political violence which occurred in the
totalitarian regimes of Latin America during the 1970's. Cienfuegos
and Monelli (1983) were among the first to describe the use of
testimony in therapy in the light of the violent repression which was
widespread under the the dictatorship of General Pinochet in Chile.
The
American psychiatrist Judith L Herman has in her research promoted
the use of testimony and attestation as a method which can be used
with those recovering from traumatic experience. Herman outlines
three stages in working therapeutically with those who have being
subject to trauma and the subsequent psychological sequalae. I will
briefly outline the first two stages and offer a more detailed
account of the third stage in trauma recovery.
The
first stage of recovery involves establishing a safe space for the
survivor which is of an absolute priority in order to establish the
effectiveness of any other therapeutic work which is to follow. This
stage may take days to weeks even years due to the nature,
chronicity, duration and early onset of abuse. Issues such as a
persons environment, lifestyle and current personal safety may well
be of issue at the primary stage. Here an adequate assessment of a
persons social situation including financial security, physical
security and integrity need to be addressed. For example persons
subject to political repression may have lost their homes, countries
and families thus such situations need to be addressed in order for
recovery to be promoted. If basic human needs such as housing, a
secure income, clothing and food are an issue then these needs to be
worked with in the first instance.
Having
established a basic form of psycho-social stability, security and a
therapeutic alliance therapeutic work can move on to the second stage
of recovery. The client then can move on to the telling of the
traumatic narrative in detail if the client so wishes. The traumatic
narrative can be reconstructed in the context of the survivors life
story. Here the empowerment of the client becomes a focus of the
therapeutic work and 'the therapist plays a role of a witness and
ally, in whose presence the survivor can speak of the unspeakable.'
Moreover,
the therapist does not occupy a neutral or non-judgemental position
in relation to the client but is rather a witness and ally to the
clients suffering and trauma. From this account of self witness or
attestation the client can move beyond the fragmentation of traumatic
memories. In the process of truth telling and witness the client can
occupy a safe space which aids recovery. Clearly, this process is
much more detailed and complex in terms of the clients experience and
in the therapeutic work of the therapist.
For
our purposes the third stage in the recovery and transformation of
trauma becomes more relevant in the discussion of bearing witness and
being an agent, the person who acts in self witness and attestation.
The resolutions which occur in the recovery from trauma involve
according to Herman a capability of the survivor to regain an
'appropriate sense of trust', trust in others, to be able to withhold
trust where not warranted, to experience autonomy in relation to self
and others, an understanding of personal boundaries, a renewed
capability for appropriate intimacy with friends and a lover and so
on. Basically, there occurs a new relationship and self identity
which recovers a fundamental trust and assurance that life is
purposeful and meaningful. For instance, Herman describes a more
creative capability to engage with a partner, children, friends or
the wider social community.
Herman
is clear to state that persons who have reached a stage whereby they
have achieved some form of resolution to their traumatic experience
are motivated to pursue their lives having achieved a peaceful and
safe way of living in the world. However, it is relevant to our
discussion of witness, testimony and attestation that Herman points
to those survivors who as part of their recovery from trauma move to
the arena of social activism and public witness outside of the
therapeutic dialogue between therapist and client. Herman does stress
that those who move into this area of social attestation are a
'significant minority,' who choose to engage in a wider societal
context. As Herman says 'these survivors recognize a political or
religious dimension in their misfortune, and discover that they can
transform the meaning of their personal tragedy by making it the
basis of social action.'
Moreover,
Herman movingly points out that eventhough 'there is no way to
compensate for an atrocity, there is a way to transcend it, by giving
it as a gift to others. The trauma is redeemed only when it becomes
the source of a survivor mission.'
Here
the notion of a phenomenology of human capabilities becomes
significant in that an engagement with social action as a form of
attestation involves the survivor as an empowered actor which entails
initiative, energy and resourcefulness which enhances the person in
their own capabilities. As Herman states 'participation in organized,
demanding social efforts calls upon the survivor's most mature and
adaptive coping strategies of patience, anticipation, altruism and
humour. It brings out the best in her; in return the survivor gains a
sense of connection with the best in other people. In this sense of
reciprocal connection, the survivor can transcend the boundaries of
her particular time and place.' This description parallels the
phenomenological description of attestation by Ricoeur and Kaufmann
in the sense that credence and assurance of the attesting self
relates to the solicitude of other human persons in the context of
the wider human social community.
The
solicitude found in social attestation and witness can have a
diversity of forms whether it be in reaching out to individuals,
intellectual pursuits, and legal or political work related to
preventing future injustices. 'Survivors understand that the natural
human response to horrible events is to put them out of mind. They
also understand that those who forget the past are often condemned to
repeat it. It is for this reason that public truth-telling is the
common denominator of all social action.'
The
process of social attestation is not a simple one, public action and
engagement by survivors involves a struggle to promote social
justice, the rule of law against the rule of force. In bearing
witness Herman states that the survivor 'must be secure in the
knowledge that simply in her willingness to tell the truth in public,
she has taken the action that perpetrators fear the most. Her
recovery is not based on the illusion that evil has been overcome,
but rather on the knowledge that it has not prevailed, and on the
hope that restorative love may still be found in the world.'
So
here Herman acknowledges that recovery from trauma can exist on both
a personal plane in the sense of the recovery of the individual
person who can move on from trauma to re-engage with the day to day
living of ordinary life. On the other plane, for some survivors
recovery moves beyond personal attestation and witness which occurs
in the therapeutic relationship to a public and social form of
attestation in the public arena. The social arena where testimony and
attestation is utilised by the survivor for the benefit of other
victims and for the wider civic community. In both cases of private
therapeutic attestation and then for some a more public form of
attestation there is the common experience of transcendence, of
moving beyond being a victim of trauma towards rediscovering what it
is to be a flourishing human being, perhaps albeit with healing
scars. Recovery for the survivor can mean that no matter what the
degrading power of evil had in the past that the survivor is a
witness, one who gives attestation in both protest and in attest to
the human hope and trust that life is worth living or as Herman
describes it 'that restorative love may still be found in the world.'
The
Logotherapy of Viktor Frankl as a Form of
Attestation.
It
can be said that Logotherapy as developed by the psychiatrist Viktor
Frankl is an example of the significance of the concept of
attestation both in terms of a recounting of Frankl's own personal
life experience and the application of his experience and thinking
in the context of the therapeutic practice of Logotherapy. Although
Frankl does not explicitly use the notion of attestation, witness or
testimony as a category in his elaboration of psychotherapy
attestation could be described as central to the promotion of meaning
for healthy human existence and human flourishing. It is to be borne
in mind that the work Man's Search for Meaning was originally
published in the German as an account of a psychologist's experience
of the concentration camps. This is clear from the original German
title of the publication which was entitled Ein Psycholog erlebt
das Konzentrationslager. (1946)
In this sense the work becomes a
powerful form of attestation and witness to the horror and human
suffering which occurred in the concentration camps. Moreover, the
work becomes a form of attestation or witness to the purpose of
therapeutic meaning in the context of man-made mass death.
(Wyschogrod) A biographical account as
testimony in the context of
the death camps also becomes a locus for a description of purpose,
resistance, protest and meaning.
An
understanding of the concept of attestation could offer a valuable
and significant elaboration for Logotherapeutic ideas and therapeutic
practice. Much work could be done to explicate in detail some of the
therapeutic notions which were elaborated by Frankl. It is
significant that many of the anthropological themes in Franklian
thought also are present in philosophical anthropology and here the
phenomenology of human capabilities is of significance. The acting,
the suffering, the thinking, story telling person as described by
Ricoeur and Kaufmann could be fruitfully developed with an
interdisciplinary benefit for both philosophy, Logotherapy and in
psychotherapy.
Rather
than develop more theoretical considerations between Logotherapy
and the phenomenology of attestation I refer to a published speech by
Frankl where testimony is precisely personal and a matter of
remembrance in the public arena. In March of 1949 Frankl gave an
address to the Viennese Society of Physicians entitled In
Memoriam. The purpose of this
address before a learned medical society was to remember those
physicians who were victims of the Second World War. Here Frankl
attests to those physicians who perished. Frankl names those who died
as is befitting of an
occasion of remembrance.
Frankl
is well aware that witness and attestation is personal. He begins
with a quotation from the Psalms of David.....'What is man that you
are mindful of him.' as a question which the Psalmist asks of God.
Then he proceeds to give 'testimony to true physicians who could not
see others suffer, who could not let others suffer but knew how
to suffer themselves, who knew how to achieve the right kind of
suffering – courageous suffering.' (1967:107)
Frankl
himself who was a victim gives attestation to his friend Dr. Gisa
Gerbel who died shortly after entering the camp from typhoid
infection, to Dr Plautus, a doctor to the homeless and indigent from
the 16th
District of Vienna, whom
he calls the 'the Angel of Ottakring.' who was dispatched to his
death on his arrival and selection at the camp. Also is remembered
Dr. Lamberg a man 'of the old world' who even during the hardest of
slave work was interested in discussing philosophy and religion.
Frankl mentions these physicians irrespective of their
scientific status as he says:
'...I
speak of individuals, but I included all who died there. The few
stand for the many, because about the many one cannot write a
personal chronicle. However, they need no chronicle; they need no
monument. Each deed is it own monument, and more imperishable than a
monument that is merely the work of human hands. Because the deeds of
a man cannot be removed from the world; although past, it is not
irrecoverably lost in the past, but therein is irrevocably
preserved..' (1967:109)
Here
Frankl considers the irrecoverable nature of the the past which
cannot be recovered nor removed from the world. However, the past can
be irrevocably preserved, that is preserved we may say in testimony,
attestation and in naming the past in the attestations of the
present. In this sense memorial becomes witness and attestation to
the other.
Frankl
is quite clear that there were doctors in the camps who 'desecrated'
their commitment to medical ethics by experimenting on human persons.
However, he as a survivor of the camps uses an interesting
description that living through the camps 'was one big experiment –
a crucial experiment' (1967: 110) In this respect I shall quote
Frankl more extensively:
'Our
dead colleagues passed the test with honors. They proved to us that
even under the most deprived, the most humiliating conditions, man
can remain – man and true physician. What was honor to them who
gave this proof, should be a lesson to us. It should teach us what
man is, and what man can become.' (1967: 110)
Here
Frankl gives testimony to the experience of the sufferings of the
dead but also his own suffering.
'What
then is man? We have learned to know him.....We have learned to know
him in the camps, where everything unessential had been stripped from
man, where every thing which a person had – money, power, fame,
luck – disappeared: while only that remained which a man does not
“have” but which he must “be.” What remained was man himself,
who in the white heat of suffering and pain was melted down to the
essential, to the human himself.' (1967:110)
In
asking the anthropological question Frankl states ' he is a being who
continually decides what he is....thinking, this consciousness, this
(is)'the dignity of each individual human being.' (1967:110)
Conclusion:
In
this brief paper the relation between the philosophical notion of
attestation in Ricoeur and Kaufmann has been related to
psychotherapy, in particular in relation to the work of Judith Herman
and Viktor Frankl. It highlights that the concept of attestation can
be fruitful concept in the context of therapy and could be considered
for further detailed elaboration in future research and practice.
Sources:
Agger
I & Jensen. S, B. (1990) 'Testimony as ritual and Evidence in
psychotherapy for political refugees. J.Traumatic Stress.
3:115-130.
Cienfuegos.
A. J. & Monelli. C. (1983) 'The Testimony of Political Repression
as a Therapeutic Instrument.' Amer. J. Orthopsychiat.
53 (1), 43-51.
Frankl.
V.E. (1985) Man's Search for Meaning. USA: Washington Square
Press.
__________
(1967) Psycotherapy and Existentialism: Selected Papers on
Logotherapy. New York: Washington Square Press.
Hahn.
L. E. (ed) (1995) The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. USA: Open
Court.
Herman.
J.L. (1992) Trauma and Discovery. New York: Basic Books.
___________
(2002) Recovery from Psychological Trauma. Psychiatry and Clinical
Neurosciences, 52: S98-S103. DOI:
10.1046/j.1440-18191998.0520s5S145.x
Kaufmann,
Sebastian, (2010) "The Attestation of the Self as a Bridge
Between Hermeneutics and Ontology in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur"
Dissertations(2009-).Paper34.
http://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu/34
Lewis.J.
(1991) 'Paul Ricoeur's Hermeneutics of the Self and Jean Nabert's
Hermeneutics of Testimony.' Journal
of French and Francophone Philosophy. Vol.3. No 1. 20-28.
Mollica.
R. (1988) 'The Trauma Story: The psychiatric care of refugee
survivors of violence and torture.' In: Ochberg F (ed.), Post
Traumatic therapy and Victims of Violence. Brunner/Mazel, New
york, 1988; 295-314.
Raghuvanshi.
L. & Agger. I. (2008) Giving Voice – Using Testimony as a
Brief Therapy Intervention in Psychosocial Community Work for
Survivors of Torture and Organised Violence: Manual for Community
Workers and Human Rights Defenders. Uttar Pradesh,
India.
Ricoeur.
P. (2002) Oneself as Another. ET. Chicago: Chicago University
Press.
Wyschogrod.
E. (1985) Spirit in Ashes: Hegel, Heidegger, and Man-Made Mass
Death. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Edward
S Gardner
Heaton
Hypnosis and Psychotherapy Practice
Email:
ipnoetic@gmail.com
Heaton Hypnosis and Psychotherapy Practice: Existential Hyypnosis
Heaton Hypnosis and Psychotherapy Practice: Existential Hypnosis: Existential Philosophy, Hypnosis and Hypnotherapy: Reflections. Existential Hypnotherapy by King and Citrenbaum was published i...
Existential Hypnosis
Existential
Philosophy, Hypnosis and Hypnotherapy: Reflections.
Existential
Hypnotherapy by King and Citrenbaum was published in 1993 and was
one of the first studies which focused on the relationship between
hypnosis, hypnotherapy and existential philosophy.i
It offers an introduction to the main central themes in existential
philosophy covering the concept of Being (Dasein), Letting Go
(Gellasenheit), Anxiety (Angst), Will and Power, and
the use of metaphor in psychotherapy.
King
and Citrenbaum were both trained in Ericksonian Hypnosis and they
also have written on the use of hypnosis for habit control.
The
study from the perspective of existential analysis attempts to
integrate existential concepts with the practice of psychotherapy and
in particular the modality of hypnosis.
In
developing the Ericksonian approach the study highlights that it is
an oversimplification to characterise the Ericksonian method as only
an indirect approach to therapeutic communication in light of the
existential themes which are apparent in Ericksonian psychotherapy.
In this respect attention is brought to bear on existential ontology
or the study of Being qua Being, in particular the Sartrean
account of ontology developed by Jean Paul Sartre in Being and
Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology. (1943)ii
Sartre
in his phenomenological ontology develops the Husserlian concept of
intentionality and the Heideggerian concept of Being (Dasein)
as expressed in the phrase “Existence precedes essence.”
The
onto-theological tradition derived from Classical Philosophy and the
Christian appropriation of Greek philosophical ideas prioritises
'essence' over 'existence'. In this respect from the therapeutic
perspective the existential use of hypnosis does not focus on
personal essences, ego strengthening or personality typologies. The
therapeutic focus informed by existential analysis centres upon life
as it is actually lived and experienced, as Life-world (Lebsenwelt),
a person's existential reality.
Hypnosis
is situated with the historical research developments on the nature
of hypnosis. In particular, the experimental research which was
undertaken in the post world war II period, much of this being
experimental – laboratory research carried out in the USA. For
instance, the altered state theory of hypnosis in the work of Hilgard
is regarded as an anti-existential theory since it relies on a
pre-conceived theory and distinct phenomenological hypnotic state
which is then applied to the therapeutic subject.iii
The existential approach to hypnosis places significance on the
experience of trance as a form of focused attention which occurs in
the therapeutic alliance created in the therapy session. In this
respect King and Citrenbaum reject the Ericksonian notion that all
hypnosis is auto-hypnosis. Trance work and experience are understood
as part of a dialectical and dialogical relationship between the
therapist who uses hypnosis and the client who experiences trance.
Thus, hypnosis is understood as a co-operative process between two
persons which seeks to have beneficial results for the client who
engages in an 'I' and 'thou' relationship.(Martin Buber)
Hypnosis
is a therapeutic modality within a wider therapeutic context and
experience. From the existential viewpoint the understanding of the
nature of hypnosis as focused attention thus describes trance as a
process and not a thing and in such a process there is
the opportunity for making constructive behavioural and perspectival
change.
In
a more detailed application of existential analysis to hypnosis three
existential concepts are of significance. These are the concepts of
co-constitutionality, self concept and diagnostic labelling.
The
concept of co-constitution is derived from the thought of the
father of modern phenomenology, Edmund Husserl. In the Logical
Investigations and in The Crisis of European Sciences
and Transcendental Phenomenology Husserl situates the human
subject as having three aspects, the person, the situation in which
the person finds themselves and the relationship between these two
aspects – the self – world relationship.
Husserl,
following the work of his teacher, Brentano insisted that the
epistemological relation of the subject to the world is a matter of
intentionality. That is, all knowing is in its nature intentional
between the subject of knowing and the object known. Subject and
object are already related in the self – world relation.
Consciousness is always already conscious of something.
This
philosophical theory stands in distinction to the description of
being and personal identity as developed by Descartes and further
developed in the Cartesian tradition. The Cartesian analysis of the
self as denoted in the dictum “Cogito ergo Sum,” “I think
therefore I am.” is in contradistinction to the reality of the
external world which leads to a radical dualism between the ego as
thinking and the external world as physical extension. (Res
Exstensa).
This
leads modern philosophy in a dualistic direction whereby the
self-world relation becomes characterised by a radical dichotomy so
much so that the philosophical problematic becomes a matter of the
proof of the external world's existence and the existence of the
isolated individuality of the ego. Cartesianism creates a split
between the subject and object. So in the therapeutic context the
problematic becomes the question of a radically separate experience
of the self. So instead of approaching the self-life-world relation
in terms of 'Who am I?', the self is situated as a primordial
relational knowing. In the therapeutic context negative self concepts
are not considered in terms of essences which are immutably given but
in terms of the person, world and self relation as intentionally
co-constituted. The question posed in the frame as “Who am I?” in
the Cartesian sense implies an 'objective contingency across
situations' whereas in terms of co-constitution and intentionality
the question of identity places the subject and world together. Thus,
the more proper description of the ego becomes “Who am I – Where,
When and with Whom, and with What.” This perspective becomes
relevant to therapeutic practice in which psychological disturbance
needs to be situated in the context of person and life-world.
Existential
analysis questions the use of diagnostic psychiatric categories. From
the viewpoint of the existential-phenomenological method working with
the malleability of self concepts arises out of the experience of
alienation and process rather than in static concepts of the self.
This is summed up by King and Citrenbaum in the phrase “The sound
of an ideal self concept is silence.” Intentionality and
co-constitution resists the promotion of the use of negative
labelling by placing the human subject in the self-world relation as
a possibility which is orientated to the present and future.
Metaphorically, it is interesting to ask what would be the sound of
an existential self?
Amongst
the prominent themes in existential analysis is the concept of
anxiety as disclosive of the nature of existence. However, rather
than considering anxiety as a source of psychological distress and
paralysis, anxiety is re-framed in the existential perspective as a
calling to action in the present and future.
Another
prominent theme in existential analysis are the concepts of
individual freedom, and responsibility over and against the crowd,
“The They”, Das Man, the anonymous social group.
The
significance of individual human freedom derives from the philosophy
of action in which the human subject is always capable of free choice
in relation to any circumstance of existence. Freedom and choice are
made in the context of co-constitutionality. This means by its nature
existential choice inevitably means a confrontation with limit
situations, Grenzsituationen, the existentialia of human
boundaries or limit. (Karl Jaspers) One choice inevitably closes off
another possibility which has to be accepted in its facticity.
Equally one choice may open up further possibilities which of its
nature closes others.
The
emphasis on existential freedom in the therapeutic context of
hypnotherapy focuses on the notion of recovery, of situating the
client as being a volunteer who chooses to engage with change
rather than being a passive victim of circumstance.
This is often reflected in subtle changes in the clients use of
language with the emergence of a more directed and confident use of
the first person singular which is similar to Freudian therapeutic
aim of promoting the ego, 'Where Id is, ego shall be.' It is
interesting to note that Bruno Bettelheim in his book Freud and
Man's Soul (1982) which deals
with the dubious translation of Freud from the German into the
Standard English Edition highlights that the translator was prone to
use medical terminology or Latin and Greek terms in order to present
psychoanalysis as more scientific to an Anglo-American audience which
is more influenced by the empirical philosophical tradition. As
Bettelheim says it is one thing to say “My ego won't any longer be
run by irrational anxieties.” and “I
won't any longer be run by my
irrational anxieties.” In the existential perspective it is
important for the person to be responsible for their acts of self
agency and this is entailed in the enunciation of the acting
person....in the first person singular. Furthermore, one can suggest
that an appropriate translation of Freud would show a far more
humanistic-existential account of Freud and his therapeutic work than
would be gathered from the Standard Edition with its empiricist
gloss.iv
Existential
analysis maintains that freedom is a possibility for the human
existent. Freedom can be rejected in the refusal to accept
responsibility in what Sartre denoted as 'bad faith,' Mavais foi.
The
inauthenticity of bad faith is manifest in the refusal to accept
decisions which are implied in being and assenting to the freedom of
decision and choice. This is particularly the case in the context of
personal relations to others. This is manifest in such cases where a
person for example works excessively hard to please others when
ultimately a person is ultimately responsible to themselves.
Human
freedom becomes most apparent according to existential analysis in
the will to power which is the operation of personal power acting in
the world. The sense of empowerment derives from commitment and hard
work which is often misunderstood particularly in the context of
hypnosis where clients often expect instant and quasi-magical results
without prior full commitment to change.
Finally,
existential analysis notes that in human existence there is a
fundamental uncertainty which characterises human life.
Existential
analysis quite correctly situates the modality of hypnosis as a
methodological treatment within the wider aspect of general
psychotherapy. The existential use of hypnosis focuses on the
dialogical relationship between the therapist and client. In the
dialogical relationship where a positive description of the hypnotic
trance is shared with the client, stressing that it is the client who
puts him or herself in the trance process, and thus accentuating the
client's experience of self control. It is by this means that the
client is convinced of the positive and constructive purpose of
entering into the trance experience. The trance is further ratified
by the experience of time distortion, that is the reduction or
extension in the experience of the phenomenological flow of time.
King
and Citrenbaum raise the point from their perspective that it is a
misunderstanding to characterise the Ericksonian approach using
'magical metaphors' as a technique. Rather Erickson worked also with
psychiatric methods within the greater perspective of overall lived
experience. (Lebenswelt) Moreover, Erickson developed his own deeply
personal existential style which was authentic to himself.
Since
existential analysis describes trance as a process rather than a
state this has significance for the notion of hypnotizability and
susceptibility for hypnotic trance. The capability for trance is
described metaphorically as akin to the human capacity for being
poetic. As to susceptibility it is the clients motivation which
determines the susceptibility for the trance experience.
The
use of standardized scales which are often used in clinical and
research settings thus becomes at best irrelevant to the experience
of the trance process but can be considered as encouraging a negative
outcome for the client entering into the trance experience.
As
to the depth of trance, existential analysis avoids too much emphasis
on the depth of trance. In the dialogical relationship between
therapist and client the therapist utilises the client's 'natural
style' of trance focusing on engagement oriented to the process of
change. It is stressed that each person has his or her own level of
trance, and that in the trance process there is an ebb and flow of
trance experience during the therapeutic session. Existential
analysis regards the notion of depth of trance as having little
significance for the therapeutic engagement. The aim of hypnosis in
therapy is not the depth of trance but the resolution of the
presenting problem or concern.
In
terms of the induction process it is understood to be a detailed form
of focused attention with the use of pacing with the client by
mirroring words and rhythm. This leads to a slowing pace for the
client with the reduction in the experience of anxiety. In focused
attention the client learns to concentrate on the here and now of the
experiential – existential moment. In the trance experience there
occurs the suspension of rumination or critical judgement and the
transformation of the operation of negative images in terms of self
concept. Trance enhances the ability of the client to visualise
positive change.
Existential
analysis uses hypnosis as a therapeutic method to enhance the
personal experience of power and the ability of the client to engage
responsibly with their experience. This involves accepting that human
life is always 'imperfectly human.' In terms of past experience this
involves the recognition that the past is properly past, that there
is nothing I can do about the past as an existential fact or
facticity. In adopting this position in lived experience the
existential concept 'Letting go' is utilised. The letting go of self
representations especially of negative self concepts enables a more
adequate or authentic change in the future. In this way 'being' is
experienced as 'becoming.' (Whitehead) The technical aspects of
hypnosis in the existential perspective of letting go focuses on the
re-organisation of the clients experience in line with the
Ericksonian idea that trance itself is an experience that re-orients
realities. The re-framing of experience involves the creation of new
healthy experiences in response to personal history and motivation in
the present. Trance as the experience of letting go enables the
client to experience the world differently and otherwise.
In
trance work concerning post traumatic experience hypnosis works to
free up dissociated amnesic memories. Here King and Citrenbaum employ
diverse methods ranging from Gestalt, Bodily awareness, Here and Now
awareness exercises and Mock Funerals. Also is significant is the use
of embedded suggestions which register in the unconscious during
trance.
One
aspect of the practice of general psychotherapy is the promotion of
empowerment in the client. This idea is expressed in existential
analysis as the notion of 'will to power.' The will to power means
that the human subject is a locus of will, action and decision in an
inalienable manner. (Frankl) Rather than a scientific or
psycho-analytic notion of cause and effect denoted in for instance
Freud's mechanistic description of the psyche, an existential
analysis is based on a philosophy of personal power and motivation,
action takes priority. The danger of a causal – effect approach to
the freedom of the existential subject is that it promotes a static
ideation that we are caused by x, y or z and so on which in effect
dis-empowers the human person. For example we thus consider ourselves
as the victims of our childhood experience. In this respect
existential analysis is critical of therapies which are based on
'inner child' ideas since the problem risks that focus is given to
situating the existential subject as 'passive.' Moreover, losing
oneself in the crowd to avoid responsibility is a form whereby the
self is isolated in social anonymity. This viewpoint very much
resembles the critique of the Jungian Child Archetype as developed in
the thought of the Archetypal psychologist, James Hillman. In
focusing on the psychological concept of the inner child the problem
arises that we develop a psychological perspective which itself is
infantile and perpetuates a situation whereby the client becomes
stuck in a passive and infantile position. If the self – world
relation, Lebenswelt is one of appropriation, process and
change then we ought to situate the adult as responsive and
responsible for their own relation and response to any life event. In
a sense, the use of the concept of 'the will to power' helps to
identify those early childhood years of socialisation as a form of
childhood hypnosis to transform the feeling of being a
victim of circumstances and events to be replaced by the
will to power in the present and future. We are the agents of our own
act and acting.
Self
hypnosis is explained in the light of the notion of the will to power
whereby the subject uses self hypnosis as an exercise of focusing and
refocusing of attention. In this respect, self hypnosis requires
discipline, engagement and effort.
Anxiety
(Angst) has been considered a fundamental disclosive concept in
existential philosophy. Anguish and anxiety is the presentation of
fear for myself as an existing and finite being in the world. The
concept was classically developed by the Danish philosopher
Kierkegaard as the concept of Dread. Kierkegaard uses the concept of
Angst which places the human person as subject to radical contingency
which can only be resolved by taking a leap of faith in relation to
God. In a non-thesitic manner Heidegger uses the term to denote an
anxiety which structures the whole of human life and which determines
our responsibility to respond to our anxious condition. Sartre uses
the term Angoisse which is used in a similar sense to the
Heideggerian usage.
Whilst
in the therapeutic arena anxiety is often experienced as profoundly
distressing. Existential analysis interprets the experience of
anxiety as an opportunity to exercise human freedom and
responsibility. Again trance of its very nature is used to re-frame,
re-label the experience of anxiety. The human person is not simply
the victim – patient of human experience. Choice and responsibility
are intrinsic to authentic human existence. Here again, the practice
of self hypnosis can be of use with regard to self care and
self-consideration where by the anxieties of the day are given over
in the sense of letting go. Trance itself is inimical to the
experience of anxiety and under proper guidance trance can assist
focused attention on the present thus forestalling anxiety,
rumination, worry and anticipatory anxiety.
It
is interesting to note that existential analysis considers anxiety as
disclosive of being manifesting the potentialities of freedom and
responsibility in our engagement with the world. Anxiety and phobic
anxiety often involves very focused forms of anxious attention and
this is paralleled in the focusing process of trance. So in the
trance state of hypnosis there is an opportunity to educate the
client in the trance-like nature of the experience of anxiety in
order to assist the client to re-focus when confronting anxiety and
to move beyond the trance-like experience of anxiety. More recently,
Michael Yapko has described the trance-like nature of depression
which also parallels the trance process. So in trance work with
anxiety and depression we can re-hearse new ways to experience the
world. The human person is not fated to repeat the past or to
paralysis in the present.
The
therapeutic use of hypnosis in existential therapy also focuses on
the personal meaning of symptoms for the client. Personal symptoms
and concerns occur within the particular instance of a
phenomenological world. Here the existential therapist shows a deep
respect for personal experience and hypnosis is used to enhance the
meaningful engagement with symptomatology. Symptoms are understood to
be meaningful. In this respect hypnosis contributes to the
facilitation of awareness. In cases where the client finds it
difficult to articulate descriptive and meaningful responses to
symptoms it is suggested that the therapist in line with his or her
insight may use multiple choice questioning in order to elicit
meaningful understanding. If this is difficult to verbalise in the
trance process then the technique of ideo-motor responses such as the
raising of the fingers for positive or negative responses to
questioning can be used. Also minimal unconscious cues may well be
noted by the therapist such the nodding of the head.
Following
the significance of Husserlian phenomenology and the later
developments in phenomenological hermeneutics an existential use of
hypnosis seeks to elaborate on the importance of metaphor in the
therapeutic alliance. It is often the case that rather than
discursive – rational interventions in therapy it is the use of
metaphor which can be disclosive for creative change in the client.
Rather than a philosophical discussion about personal responsibility
and human freedom the use of metaphorical phrases such as 'the ball
is in your court,' may lead to greater creative responses.
In
terms of hypnosis the use of metaphor keeps in touch with the clients
own symbolic and metaphorical world which then can be paced and
reflected to the client in their own experience. In this respect
existential analysis understands that the unconscious itself is a
metaphor in the persons own life-world (Lebenswelt) and also a
metaphor operative within the psychoanalytic tradition itself. This
also reflects the Ericksonian idea of the unconscious as a store
house of learning experience which is always there for the
utilisation of the subject. Here the unconscious becomes a
metaphorical reason for behavioural and perspectival change. In a
sense since the unconscious is being used in itself as a metaphor
then questions regarding the epistemological status of the the
unconscious as a psychic existent is thus irrelevant in the
therapeutic dialogue. The unconscious becomes an excuse or rationale
for change.
Edward
Gardner
Heaton
Hypnosis and Psychotherapy Practice
iKing,
M, E. and Citrenbaum. C, M. (1993) Existential Hypnotherapy.
New York and London. The Guilford Press.
iiSartre.
J.P. (1976) Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological
Ontology. London: Methuen.
iiiHilgard.E,R.
(1968) The Experience of Hypnosis: A Shorter Version of Hypnotic
Susceptibility. New York and London. Harvest.
ivBettelheim.
B. (1982) Freud and Man's Soul. London. Penguin.
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